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Abstract
The literature on the indispensability argument for mathematical realism
often refers to the ‘indispensable explanatory role’ of mathematics. I argue
that we should examine the notion of explanatory indispensability from the
point of view of specific conceptions of scientific explanation. The reason
is that explanatory indispensability in and of itself turns out to be insuffi-
cient for justifying the ontological conclusions at stake. To show this I intro-
duce a distinction between different kinds of explanatory roles—some ‘thick’
and ontologically committing, others ‘thin’ and ontologically peripheral—
and examine this distinction in relation to some notable ‘ontic’ accounts of
explanation. I also discuss the issue in the broader context of other ‘explan-
ationist’ realist arguments.
1 Introduction
Much of the recent literature on the indispensability argument for mathematical
realism discusses the ‘indispensable explanatory role’ of mathematics. It is com-
monplace to articulate the Quine–Putnam defence of mathematical realism in ex-
plicitly explanatory terms, and for many the prospects of platonism hang on the
indispensability or otherwise of mathematics to empirical explanations. This paper
identifies and addresses a clear lacuna in this prominent line of research: examin-
ing explanatory indispensability from the point of view of specific conceptions of
scientific explanation. I will incentivize the task of filling out this critical lacuna
and also take some initial steps towards it by introducing a pertinent distinction
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regarding the way in which mathematics contributes to explanation. Drawing this
distinction is critical especially for the ontological conclusion of the indispensab-
ility argument.
To set the context I will review the significance of the notion of ‘explanat-
ory role’ for the mathematical indispensability argument, first in general terms
(Sect. 2), and then with reference to a particular mathematical explanation (Sect. 3).
After drawing a distinction between ontologically committing ‘thick’ and ontolo-
gically peripheral ‘thin’ explanatory roles in general terms (Sect. 4), I will further
examine this distinction in relation to three notable ‘ontic’ accounts of explanation:
Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation (Sect. 5); Woodward’s counterfactual ac-
count (Sect. 6); and Strevens’s kairetic account (Sect. 7). The connection between
explanation and ontology is prima facie most plausible in the context of such ontic
accounts of explanation, as opposed to epistemic or modal accounts, as I will ex-
plain (Sect. 4). In each case we will find ample room for regarding mathematics as
playing only a thin, ontologically peripheral role in mathematical explanations of
empirical phenomena. In conclusion I will discuss the take-home message in the
broader context of other explanationist realist arguments (Sect. 8).
2 Realism and Explanatory Indispensability
Many realist arguments support ontological commitment to X by pointing to X’s
explanatory indispensability. This is exemplified by Baker’s ‘Enhanced Indispens-
ability Argument’ for mathematical realism:
(1) We ought rationally to believe in the existence of any entity that
plays an indispensable explanatory role in our best scientific the-
ories.
(2) Mathematical objects play an indispensable explanatory role in
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science.
(3) Hence, we ought rationally to believe in the existence of math-
ematical objects.
(Baker 2009, p. 613)
This is, of course, just the familiar Quine–Putnam defence of platonism cast
explicitly in terms of the ‘indispensable explanatory role’ of mathematics.1 The
key idea is that the indispensability argument should really turn on the specific
kind of indispensability that commits a scientific realist to paradigmatic (non-
mathematical) theoretical posits, such as electrons, quarks, and black holes; ar-
guably the scientific realist is committed to such unobservables precisely because
these ‘theoretical posits’ play an indispensable explanatory role in our best science.
This focus on mathematics’ indispensable explanatory role is widespread in
the current debates on the indispensability argument. The connection between a
posit’s explanatory role and ontological commitment to it is endorsed by some
leading mathematical fictionalists alike. Field (1989), for example, states that:
If a belief plays an ineliminable role in explanations of our observa-
tions, then other things being equal we should believe it, regardless of
whether that belief is itself observational, and regardless of whether
the entities it is about are observable. (Field 1989, p. 15)2
Both sides of the debate largely agree that one cannot respond to the explanation-
focused indispensability argument by insisting that there cannot be mathematical
1The indispensability argument in the Quine–Putnam tradition turns on a broader notion of indis-
pensability, typically associated more closely with predictions and confirmation. In the more recent
literature there has been a distinct shift towards the explanationist construal of indispensability.
2It is clear from the quote’s context that ‘unobservable entities’ for Field can include mathem-
atical abstracta, and an important part of Field’s (1989) defence of fictionalism is his denial that
mathematics ever plays such an ‘ineliminable’ explanatory role.
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explanations of empirical phenomena since all scientific explanation is causal.3
The disagreement is rather about whether or not it is the case that ‘mathematics
can play non-causal explanatory roles in science and that this is a real role’ (Co-
lyvan 2012, p. 1033). Colyvan aptly sums up the gist of the debate:
[A] great deal hangs on the role of mathematics in scientific explan-
ations. If mathematical entities do not play the right sort of role in
scientific explanations, then this needs to be spelled out in a way that
distinguishes mathematical entities from other entities quantified over
in our best scientific theories. (Colyvan 2012, p. 1043)
Given the state of debate, the key notion of ‘explanatory role’ is in dire need
of clear analysis. But while there have been some efforts to spell out contrasting
intuitions about whether or not mathematics is genuinely explanatory of empirical
phenomena, remarkably the literature has made almost no contact with philosoph-
ical accounts of explanation.4 In the current state of debate it is very much unclear
exactly what ‘mathematics’ explanatory role’ amounts to, and it is difficult to say
who in the debate gets the upper hand regarding the contested claim that math-
ematics really does play such a role in science. What we have on the table goes
little beyond largely unregimented interpretations of a heterogeneous assortment
3This both begs the question and is in tension with the actual science which is seemingly teeming
with non-causal explanations.
4Baker 2005 contains a brief discussion of three broad accounts of explanation. Lyon 2012 is a
much more notable exception, which I will presently examine (Sect. 5). See also Batterman 2010
and Pincock 2011 for a useful analysis of the explanatory role of mathematics in the context of the
so-called mapping account of applied mathematics. Apart from these few exceptions the growing
literature on the indispensability argument just floats freely of theories of explanation. For example,
while Baker 2009 ably analyses (and defends) the notion that mathematics is indispensable for some
of our best scientific explanations, he says little in general about what it is to play an explanatory
role, and none of his analysis relates to a considered theory of scientific explanation. Similarly—on
the other side of the debate—Yablo 2012 has recently argued that mathematics’ indispensability in
scientific explanations can be interpreted in ways that do not support the indispensability arguments,
since the explanatory role need not be played by mathematical objects. Yablo’s point is in my view
well-taken, but again it is worth pointing out that his analysis of mathematics’ explanatory roleis
given in general terms and not in relation to any specific account of scientific explanation.
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of examples of scientific explanations that somehow involve mathematics in an
important way.
How do we best push the debate forward? Common sense suggests that we
should aim to bring our best understanding of scientific explanation to bear on the
debate and examine the notion of ‘(mathematics’) explanatory role’ in relation to
different analyses and conceptions of explanation. In this way we can hope to
gain a much closer grip on ‘explanatory role’ so as to be better placed to judge
whether mathematics plays the kind of explanatory role that actually matters for
the ontological debate in question.
In the rest of this paper I will take some initial steps in this direction, by first
looking into the notion of ‘explanatory role’ in general terms, before examining it
in more detail in relation to three specific accounts of explanation. The premise (1)
of the Enhanced Indispensability Argument above is undermined as a result.
3 Dissecting ‘explanatory role’
Let us briefly recall a central example of allegedly explanatory mathematics to
begin with. (The rest of our discussion will benefit from having this staple example
clearly in mind. Although I regard the example as problematic on multiple counts
(see e.g. Saatsi 2011), for all its shortcomings and simplicity it functions well to
illustrate the points I wish to make, and it will also conveniently allow us to relate
the present point of view to earlier literature.)5
Explanandum: why is the life-cycle of the North-American cicada 13 or 17
years (depending on sub-species)?
Stylized explanation of the 17-year pediod:6
5Lange 2013 refines the conception of the cicada explanation as a mathematical explanation. I
will stick to Baker’s original presentation to better reflect the evolving dialectic around it.
6Quoted from Baker 2009 (p. 614).
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(4) Having a life-cycle period which minimizes intersection with
other (nearby / lower) periods is evolutionarily advantageous.
[biological law]
(5) Prime periods minimize intersection (compared to non-prime peri-
ods). [number theoretic theorem]
(6) Hence organisms with periodic life-cycles are likely to evolve
periods that are prime. [‘mixed’ biological / mathematical law]
(7) Cicadas in ecosystem-type, E, are limited by biological constraints
to periods from 14 to 18 years. [ecological constraint]
(8) Hence cicadas in ecosystem-type, E, are likely to evolve 17-year
periods.
We can similarly explain the 13-year pediod by plugging in appropriate ecological
constraints. The key biological premise (4) can be supported in evolutionary terms,
based e.g. on the relative fitness advantage of individuals whose offspring are more
likely to avoid predators that are themselves periodical, and less likely to breed
with other cicada species.
In this DN-type explanatory argument mathematics can seem to play an ex-
planatory role by virtue of being employed in the deduction of the explanandum
(8). For someone operating with a Hempelian DN-model in mind, the mathemat-
ical parts (5) and (6) above seem just as explanatory as the other parts, especially
given the sense in which the universal ‘law’ (6) ‘covers’ the specific, ecologically
constrained 17-year case stated in the explanandum.
The DN-model has long been obsolete, however, and it is furthermore unclear
how ‘explanatory role’ should be linked to ontological commitment in something
like the DN-account.7 But once we renounce the DN-account it is an open question
7Although it is part of the ‘adequacy conditions’ in Hempel’s DN-model that for any actual
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how exactly explanatory contributions should be attributed to different parts of an
explanatory story or argument (such as Baker’s stylized explanation above). It is
thus very much legitimate for us to ask: are the mathematics-laden elements (5)
and (6) really contributing to the explanatoriness of the explanation of (8) above?
How do we begin to answer this question? Naturally, by considering it in
relation to different accounts of scientific explanation. (How else?) Before we
get started on this, let us motivate this approach further by recalling some earlier
commentaries on the cicada example.
I have argued elsewhere that mathematics in the cicada case need not be viewed
as playing an indispensable explanatory role at all (Saatsi 2011). Mathematics is
not indispensable, since we could replace (5) and (6) in the above argument by:
(5/6)* For periods in the range 14–18 years the intersection minimizing
period is 17. [Fact about time]
This yields an alternative deduction of (8) from the relevant biological assump-
tions without the mathematics, and I argued that this deduction is as explanatory as
the original deduction (4)-(8) above.8 Furthermore, I suggested that a seemingly
indispensable employment of mathematics in scientific explanations could be inter-
preted as having a representational function: in the cicada case mathematics rep-
resents those features of time (e.g. its linearity) that are doing all the explanatory
work. Mathematics can well be advantageous for empirical explanations by virtue
of playing such representational role, for example by justifying non-mathematical
explanation the explanans must be true, the problem is that the DN-account is an ‘epistemic’ (as
opposed to ‘ontic’ or ‘modal’) account of explanation. (I will recall the distinction presently.) Ac-
cording to the DN-model the function of an explanation is to give understanding. (Hempel equated
understanding with expectability, but other conceptions of understanding could be conjoined with the
central idea that explanations are arguments that provide understanding.) However understanding is
construed, it is not clear why mathematics, fictional models, or even things like diagrams would have
to be true in order to play an explanatory role in the epistemic sense of providing understanding.
8More specifically, I argued that the inclusion of mathematics in the cicada case is not a source of
any further explanatory power, and that the prime number explanation does not enjoy any advantage
of generality since (5/6)* can be naturally extended to more general facts about time.
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explanatory assumptions (such as (5/6)*, above) that arguably provide all the ex-
planatory power.
This line of thought can be accused of begging the question: what justific-
ation is there for recasting the mathematics involved as having a ‘merely’ rep-
resentational role, if scientists themselves do not appeal to any kind of explanat-
ory/representational dichotomy? Baker’s thesis that mathematics is indispensable
for explaining can be directly motivated, by contrast, by taking scientists’ pro-
nouncements to this effect at face value. This is in essence how Baker and Colyvan
(2011) respond to the ‘indexing strategy’ (as executed in Daly and Langford 2009),
according to which mathematics should only be viewed as ‘indexing’ (viz. repres-
enting) non-mathematical facts about the world. Baker and Colyvan maintain that
the indexing strategy is at severe odds with the scientific practice which arguably
indispensably involves number theory, for example, in connection with the period-
ical cicada. In a similar manner Pincock (2012) defends the existence of mathem-
atical explanations (viz. explanations for which mathematics ‘makes an explanat-
ory contribution’) via a ‘comparison test’, which considers available explanations
of (say) the cicada phenomenon to see whether or not the ‘best explanation’ (as
judged by scientists) makes use of a mathematical claim.9
If we follow these authors to accept the lead from scientific practice and admit
that mathematics can indeed be indispensable to some of our best scientific explan-
ations, is there any room left for me manoeuvre? Is it not simply incoherent to now
deny that mathematics plays an indispensable explanatory role?
Well, answer to this question turns out on closer reflection to depend on what
we mean by ‘explanatory role’. It now becomes critical for us to clarify this notion
in order to zero in on the key point of contention. For while there undeniably is a
9Note that Pincock does not endorse the inference from explanatory indispensability to mathem-
atical realism, however, since he denies the principle of inference to the best explanation in a form
required for this inference.
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sense in which we can construe mathematics in the cicada and other examples as
‘explanatory’, or as ‘playing an explanatory role’, what really matters for the indis-
pensability argument—all that matters!—is whether or not mathematics plays the
kind of explanatory role that we should take as ontologically committing. A prop-
erly informed analysis of scientific explanation is required in order to see whether
a face value reading of scientific practice (and the admission that mathematics is
indispensable for explanations) implies that mathematics plays an explanatory role
that is ontologically committing.
Instead of bluntly denying that mathematics is in no sense explanatory at all (or
plays no explanatory role whatsoever), a critic of the explanatory indispensability
argument is much better off insisting that mathematics does not play the right kind
of explanatory role. This strategy, of course, requires that we can somehow distin-
guish between different types of explanatory roles, some ‘thick’ and ontologically
committing, others ‘thin’ and ontologically peripheral. The next section will dis-
cuss this distinction in the abstract, along with some other useful distinctions. After
that I will show how this kind of distinction can be drawn in the context of some
specific ontic accounts of explanation.
4 Useful distinctions
Salmon (1985) introduced the notion of ontic account of explanation, distinguish-
ing it from epistemic accounts, on the one hand, and modal accounts, on the other.
This tripartite classification is well known in the philosophy of scientific explana-
tion. It is worth recalling it here as its relevance has never been noted in the present
context. For our discussion a useful way of characterising the classification is as
follows.
The basic idea behind an ontic conception of explanation is that explanation is
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a matter of situating the explanandum within a broader ontic structure of the world.
The explanatory power derives from stating some relevant worldly facts: objective
causal or mechanistic facts, or nomological facts, or statistical relevance relations,
or symmetries, or whatever ontic structures can bear an objective relationship of ex-
planatory relevance to the explanandum. (Causal and causal-mechanical accounts
of explanation are paradigmatic examples of the ontic conception, and also what
Salmon primarily had in mind in characterising this conception, but we should con-
strue ‘ontic structure of the world’ in broader terms to make room for mathematical
and non-causal explanations.) Typically explanatory relevance is a matter of exhib-
iting some kind of dependence of the explanandum on the explanans, in the way
‘difference-making’ relations do in the paradigmatic case of causal explanation,
for instance. But not all explanatory dependence is causal. A law can depend on
other laws in an explanatory way, but laws do not cause other laws. An explanan-
dum can depend on structural constitution in an explanatory way that is not causal,
as in the case of glass’s fragility being explained by its molecular structure. An
explanandum can depend on more abstract (yet still real) structural features of the
world, as in the case of a Lorentz-contraction being explained in relativity in terms
of the fundamental kinematic structure of reality. We can also envisage the pos-
sibility of some kind of sui generis dependence of certain physical facts on some
mathematical facts so as to make conceptual room within the ontic conception for
ontologically committing mathematical explanations.
The basic idea behind an epistemic conception of explanation, by contrast, is
that an explanation is whatever we give in order to explain, where explaining is
an epistemic activity of providing understanding. Following Hempel and many
others, providing understanding can be viewed as a matter of showing that the ex-
planandum was to be expected (given the explanans), but different conceptions of
understanding are possible. According to an epistemic conception the explanat-
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ory power of an explanation derives from the fact that the explanatory information
suitably entails the explanandum so as to provide understanding. It does not derive
from the explanation pointing to features of reality that stand in a worldly relation-
ship of explanatory relevance to the explanandum.
Finally, according to Salmon the modal conception a scientific explanations
does its job by ‘showing that what did happen had to happen’ (Salmon 1985,
p. 293). This is quite ambiguous by itself, and it is difficult to see any clear
difference to the ontic conception: after all, situating the explanandum within a
broader ontic structure of the world (as per the ontic conception) can show why the
explanandum had to happen given that structure. Salmon thought the distinction
between ontic and modal conceptions is a substantial one, but only in the context of
indeterministic physics. Since this isn’t our present context, Salmon’s (somewhat
inchoate) remarks on modal conception (mostly made in the context of probabil-
istic and statistical explanations) are of little interest to us here.
What is of interest, however, is a recent characterisation of the modal concep-
tion by Lange, according to whom ‘the modal conception, properly understood,
applies at least to distinctively mathematical explanation in science, whereas the
ontic conception does not’ (Lange 2013, p. 510). The modal conception, as Lange
understands it, takes explanation to be a matter of showing that the explanandum is
inevitable in the sense that it holds independently of any contingent ontic structure
at stake.
To illustrate: Mother failed to distribute twenty-three whole strawberries evenly
among her three children. Why? Because twenty-three cannot be evenly divided by
three. According to Lange the explanatory power here stems from modal inform-
ation provided by the mathematics, transcending the modal information provided
by any (actual or possible) causal or nomic structures involved in the process.
[T]hat twenty-three cannot be divided evenly by three supplies inform-
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ation about the world’s network of causal relations: it entails [as a mat-
ter of mathematical necessity] that there are no [counterlegally pos-
sible] causal processes by which twenty-three things are distributed
evenly (without being cut) into three groups. (Lange 2013, p. 496)
That is, according to the modal conception (thus understood) we can explain by
showing, by reference to mathematical facts, that the explanandum had to take
place, or be the way it is, regardless of what the ontic structure of the world is like
(as long as the world satisfies the description of the system at stake, involving a
mother, and so on).10
Let us now consider the issue of ontological commitment in relation to this
rough-and-ready distinction between ontic, epistemic, and modal conceptions. Prima
facie, the connection between explanatory mathematics and ontological commit-
ment to mathematics is plausible in the context of an ontic account of explanation,
since according to the ontic conception explanatory power is derivative only from
stating explanatorily relevant worldly facts. Given the characterisation of ontic ex-
planation it is natural to think, prima facie, that if (purported) reference to X is
indispensable for explaining, then X is real, as dispensing with X results in a loss
of explanatory power, which is (purportedly) due to leaving out information about
an ontic relationship of explanatory relevance between X and the explanandum.
If mathematical explanations are instead best construed in the fashion of either
the epistemic or the modal conception, it is much less clear what the connection
between explanation and ontological commitment is meant to be, and as a result
explanatory indispensability arguments become immediately more contentious.
Consider the modal conception first. Here mathematics can play an explan-
10Note that an explanation conforms to the modal conception only if it provides such explanatory
modal information without simultaneously providing ontic information about some kind of depend-
ence relation connecting the explanandum to the relevant mathematical facts or properties. If an
explanation provides such modal information by virtue of showing, for example, how the explanan-
dum only depends on the system instantiating certain abstract mathematical properties, then it should
be viewed as ontic.
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atory role by virtue of being part of a derivation or deduction that shows that the
explanandum was inevitable to a stronger degree than results from any assumptions
regarding the ontic structure in place. Lange (2013) argues in a fascinating recent
paper that this conception best captures (some) mathematical explanations in sci-
ence. But Lange thinks, rightly in my view, that his modal account of mathematical
explanations is largely orthogonal to issues of ontological commitment. In Lange’s
analysis of ‘distinctively mathematical explanations’ mathematics plays an indis-
pensable role in providing explanatory modal knowledge, namely knowledge of
the inevitability of the explanandum, in the sense of it not depending on the actual
laws of nature. It is far from clear why this kind of explanatory role would give us
grounds to construe mathematics realistically.
Assume for the sake of the argument that a given mathematical explanation—
e.g. the strawberry example above—explains by providing knowledge of the in-
dependence of an explanandum of the actual laws of nature, so as to show that
‘what did happen had to happen’ in a strong counter-legal sense of necessity. It is
clearly a non sequitur to conclude from this that the mathematics affording us this
knowledge must itself be given a realist interpretation. Admittedly Lange writes
in a way that lends itself to a realist reading, suggesting that mathematical facts
are somehow responsible for the strong degree of necessity at stake. For example,
‘the mathematical fact entails that even a pseudoprocess rather than a causal pro-
cess [. . . ] cannot involve such a division of twenty-three things’ (Lange 2013,
p. 496). But those who balk at a realist interpretation of ‘mathematical neces-
sity’ and ‘mathematical fact’ can happily accept Lange’s idea that mathematical
explanations explain by showing that the explanandum is inevitable by virtue of
being completely independent of some pertinent feature of the ontic structure of
the world. According to Lange the explanatory power resides in this modal in-
formation, so what really matters are the explanatory modal facts, and there is
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no clear prima facie connection between explanatorily indispensable mathematics
and ontological commitment. The platonist may been feel that an anti-realist will
not be able to account for the indispensability of mathematics for obtaining such
modal information. But it is not like the platonist has at this point an explanat-
ory upper hand by being able to say something informative about the connection
between mathematical facts and modal facts. And I do not see any reason to think
that mathematics as construed by a fictionalist, for example, would be unable to
provide the kind of modal knowledge that matters according to Lange.11
Now, let us move on to briefly consider the epistemic conception. Here an ele-
ment of an explanation can be a source of explanatory power by virtue of its func-
tion in providing understanding. For example, if understanding is equated with
nomic expectability, an advocate of the epistemic conception can take mathemat-
ics as explanatory if it is employed in an explanatory argument to show that (non-
mathematical) laws and initial conditions entail the explanandum so as to demon-
strate that it was to be expected. Playing an indispensable explanatory role of this
sort could be a matter of calculational support, say; perhaps nomic expectability of
the explanandum would otherwise be only apparent to a Laplacean demon, for in-
stance. It is immediately far from clear why this conception of understanding—or
other conceptions, for that matter—would give us grounds to construe mathematics
realistically.12
So, to sum up, the ontic conception of explanation affords the most plaus-
ible connection between explanatory indispensability and ontological commitment,
prima facie. In the rest of the paper I will focus on some of the best developed and
most influential contemporary accounts of explanation, all of which are ontic ac-
11Note also that mathematics can also be used to obtain explanatory modal information even when
it is not indispensable. The strawberry example is a case in point, since it can be paraphrased into an
argument in first-order logic entailing the explanatory modal fact without referring to numbers.
12There is an interesting connection here to issues concerning the question whether understanding
is factive: several philosophers have argued that falsehoods (such as idealized models) can function
to provide understanding and even be indispensable for it. See e.g. Elgin 2004.
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counts, to show that even in the context of the ontic conception the connection
between explanation and ontology is much less direct than has been appreciated in
the indispensability debate.13 The crux of the matter is to recognise that within the
ontic conception there is scope for critical, more fine-grained distinctions between
different types of explanatory roles. We can start by conceiving the following di-
chotomy in the abstract:
‘Thick explanatory role’ is played by a fact that bears an ontic relation of explan-
atory relevance to the explanandum in question.
‘Thin explanatory role’ is played by something that allows us to grasp, or (re)present,
whatever plays a ‘thick’ explanatory role.
In the following sections I will affirm the prospects of drawing this broad dicho-
tomy in the context of some specific accounts of explanation. Recognising the
possibility of this kind of dichotomy is significant because it points to the fact that
even within the ontic conception of explanation not every explanatory role is ne-
cessarily ontologically committing (or at least is not obviously so). Only a thick
explanatory role can be related to ontological commitment in a fairly straightfor-
ward way, and the critical question regarding the indispensability argument is, of
course: Does mathematics ever play a thick explanatory role, or does it only play
a thin one?
This question, I submit, can be properly answered only in the context of specific
accounts of explanation, which also allow us to make clearer and more precise
the distinction between thick and thin explanatory roles. I will now turn to these
accounts.
13I do not pretend to have shown that the debate is a nonstarter in the context of modal or epi-
stemic conceptions. But while further work remains to be done in this context, we can appreciate the
corresponding lacuna in the indispensability debate just on the basis of our broad characterisation of
these two conceptions.
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5 Program explanation
Lyon (2012) is one of the few to analyse the explanatory role of mathematics in
terms of a specific account of explanation. Lyon argues, in effect, that mathematics
can be seen to play (what I have now called) a thick explanatory role: it plays a
‘programming’ role as characterised by Jackson and Pettit as part of their model
of program explanation. In examples like the one involving periodical cicadas
‘mathematics is indispensable to the programming of the efficacious properties’
(Lyon 2012, p. 568).
I have elsewhere criticised Lyon’s attempt to cast mathematical explanations as
program explanations (Saatsi 2012). In the contest of our current discussion the key
point of this criticism can be expressed as follows: Lyon has not established that
mathematics indeed plays a thick explanatory role in the context of the program
explanation account. That is, Lyon’s account leaves fully open the possibility that
the mathematics involved in empirical explanations, while indispensable, could be
construed as playing merely a thin explanatory role.
To see this problem clearly, let us briefly recall Lyon’s argument. Jackson and
Pettit (1990) introduce the notion of program explanation by contrasting it with a
process explanation, which is a fine-grained, straightforwardly causal explanation.
A program explanation is more abstract, and is causal only in a derivative sense:
it cites a property which guarantees the instantiation of some causally efficacious
property involved in a process explanation of the same explanandum. According
to Jackson and Pettit, a liquid’s temperature T , for example, can (program-)explain
the cracking of a glass receptacle by virtue of playing a programming role with
respect to a lower-level property also instantiated by the liquid: some particular
molecules hitting the receptacle wall with a high-enough collective momentum to
cause the cracking.14 Jackson and Pettit use examples like this to depict a sense
14See Jackson and Pettit 1990 for details.
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in which a higher-level property (such as T ), which is not causally efficacious it-
self, can nevertheless be explanatorily (and causally) relevant by virtue of standing
in a suitable ‘programming’ relationship to some causally efficacious lower-level
property.
The program explanation account is an ontic one: a successful explanation of
an event E requires that we point to a feature of the world that is explanatorily
relevant by virtue of there being a sense in which E depends on that feature of
the world. The properties that are explanatorily relevant in this sense, by virtue of
‘programming’, play a thick explanatory role characterised by an intimate modal
relation between the higher-level programming facts and the lower-level causal
facts. (Basically, it is not possible to have an explanatory higher-level fact without
also having one or another causally efficacious lower-level fact. In many examples
this relation between the properties is some kind of ‘realization’ relation.) Jackson
and Pettit capitalise on this modal relation to argue that a higher-level property
provides information about what the explanandum depends on, going beyond the
information provided by the corresponding lower-level process explanation.15
Lyon argues that mathematical explanations can also be viewed as program
explanations.
They cite properties and/or entities which are not causally efficacious
but nevertheless program the instantiation of causally efficacious prop-
erties and/or entities that causally produce the explanandum. And im-
portantly, they cite mathematical properties and/or entities that are do-
ing (at least part of) this programming work. (Lyon 2012, p. 567)
The thought is that mathematical explanations can be similarly understood as point-
ing to mathematical facts on which the empirical explanandum in question de-
15For example, arguably the dependence of the cracking of the container on the liquid’s temperat-
ure goes over and above of the information about the way in which the cracking depended on some
particular set of molecules having specific momenta.
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pends. Lyon argues, in reference to the cicada case, for example, a detailed (historico-
ecological) process explanation fails to exhaustively explain the cicada phenomenon,
because it ‘misses the fact that the final evolutionary outcome, the convergence
on 13 and 17, is robust with respect to the historico-ecological details’ (Lyon
2012, p. 567). Arguably a program explanation is needed in order to explain
this robustness—the fact that the convergence to these specific periods only de-
pends on them being co-primes to every alternative period in the relevant range of
possibilities—and here mathematics becomes indispensable:
[I]f we take away any mention of primeness from the cicada explana-
tion, the explanation falls apart, and there doesn’t seem to be anything
that would put it back together. (Lyon 2012, p. 568)
In this way mathematics arguably plays a thick explanatory role of programming.
There are various difficulties in construing mathematics as playing a program-
ming role (cf. Saatsi 2012). A key problem is the following. For Jackson and
Pettit ‘programming’ is a matter of a modal relation holding between higher-level
(‘programming’) and lower-level (causally efficacious ‘process’) properties.16 It
is critical to have a grip on this modal relation in order to grasp the sui generis
explanatory dependence at stake: program explanations are explanatory by virtue
of providing information about a higher-level dependence rooted in the modal re-
lation between higher- and lower-level properties. But we have no such grip at all
for the alleged modal relation that is meant to hold between a mathematical fact
and the lower-level causal facts.
An alternative and perhaps better way to express the problem is this. An advoc-
ate of the enhanced indispensability argument needs to establish that mathematics
16For the paradigmatic examples the programming relation is one of ‘realization’ (broadly con-
strued): temperature, as mean kinetic energy, is realised in different molecular configurations. A
determinable property is realised in different determinates, and so on.
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is playing a thick, ontologically committing explanatory role; establishing indis-
pensability simpliciter is not enough. In the context of the program explanation
idea, this can only be done by providing a substantial account of the modal rela-
tionship between the mathematical features that allegedly ‘program’, on the one
hand, and the properties that feature in the corresponding process explanations.
Lyon does not provide anything to this effect, however; rather, he just stresses
mathematics’ explanatory indispensability in explanations that he construes as pro-
gram explanations (see, for example, the quote above). But this is not enough, as
indispensable mathematics here could instead be interpreted as playing a thin, on-
tologically peripheral role.
Lyon’s appeal to the de facto indispensability of mathematics is similar in spirit
to Baker and Colyvan’s appeal to scientific practice. Keeping in mind the need for
a thick explanatory role and the details of the program explanation account we
can see why they all achieve little by such an appeal; the explanatory practice of
science does not wear its ontological commitment on its sleeve.
If mathematics does not play a programming role, but is nevertheless explan-
atorily indispensable, what other roles are there? A natural alternative is to argue
that mathematics only plays the role of representing some non-mathematical fea-
tures of the world that themselves play the programming role (as I have suggested
in Saatsi 2012). The challenges of spelling out this suggestion depend on the case
at hand, and one should not treat lightly the complexities involved in some import-
ant cases (see e.g. Batterman 2010 and Wilson 2013).17 But in the cicada case,
at least, mathematics arguably can be construed as playing such a thin representa-
tional role, representing features of time (such as that stated in (5/6)*, above, and
natural generalisations thereof) that play a thick explanatory role (Saatsi 2011).
17But note that neither Batterman nor Wilson explicate the non-representational explanatory role
of mathematics in terms of any account or conception of explanation. It is an open question how the
details of these cases will look like in the context of an appropriate account of explanation.
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Jackson and Pettit’s program explanation model is not a full-blown theory of
explanation. Rather, it is an attempt to make sense of higher-level explanations that
do not feature causally efficacious properties. Its core idea of explanatory modal
dependence can arguably be incorporated into a broader account of explanation
due to Woodward, so it is worth examining mathematics’ explanatory role in the
context of this account.18
6 Counterfactual account of explanation
Woodward’s counterfactual theory of explanation is a prominent contemporary ac-
count in the ontic tradition. Woodward has primarily intended his account to cap-
ture causal explanations, but various people have argued that its central idea can
also be applied to non-causal (e.g. geometrical) explanations (e.g. Bokulich 2008,
2011; Saatsi and Pexton 2013; Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010).19 Hence, there is
no reason to dismiss it as irrelevant in relation to (prima facie) non-causal explan-
ations e.g. of cicada periods.
The key idea inWoodward’s account is that counterfactual truths are the source
of ‘explanatory power’: to explain is to provide information that answers what-if-
things-had-been-different questions (‘w-questions’).
[A]n explanation ought to be such that [it enables] us to see what sort
of difference it would have made for the explanandum if the factors
cited in the explanans had been different in various possible ways.
(Woodward 2003b, p. 11)
(The causal dimension of Woodward’s account has to do with the fact that much
of counterfactual, explanatory information can be causally interpreted. There are
18Ylikoski (2001) argues in detail that Woodward’s account (or something very much like it) can
do all the program explanation model can. See also Woodward 2009.
19Woodward’s sympathies to this possibility are evident in section 5.9 of Woodward 2003b.
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cases where such causal interpretation is not available, however. Cf. references
above.20)
ForWoodward a DN-type deduction is only explanatory to the extent it provides
such modal information. The explanatoriness (or ‘explanatory power’) of an ar-
gument or derivation springs from correctly representing the relevant objective de-
pendency relations in the world, grounded in the world’s actual (causal-)nomological
structure.21 The account thus accords with the ontic conception of explanation.
The explanatory dependency relations can furthermore be found at different ‘levels’.
For example, there is a dependency relation that connects the cracking of the glass
receptacle (in the section above) to the liquid’s temperature, allowingWoodward to
conceive the temperature as a cause of the cracking (in Woodward’s precise sense
of causation).
Woodward’s account has the following feature that is of great interest to us
here. While it is explicitly an ontic account, it allows at the same time for a kind of
instrumentalism about genuinely explanatory theories: there is no need to accept
the ‘widely shared idea’ that ‘successful explanation is at bottom a matter of getting
fundamental ontology right’ (Woodward 2003b, p. 232). This instrumentalism is
furthermore directly motivated by the scientific practice.
[My account] is less demanding about the need for explanatory the-
ories to have a defensible ‘realistic’ interpretation (in the sense of
postulating only ‘real’ entities) and assigns a more prominent role to
‘instrumental’ success than many competing theories of explanation.
. . . [S]uch an account fits explanatory practice in many areas of science
20Woodward (2003b, Sect. 5.9) gives the example of explaining the stability of planetary orbits in
terms of its counterfactual dependence on the dimensionality of space.
21As Woodward puts it: ‘It is physical dependency relations . . . that are primary or fundamental in
causal explanation; derivational relations do not have a role to play in explanation that is independent
or prior to such dependency relations, but rather matter only insofar as (or to the extent that) they
correctly represent such relationships’ (Woodward 2003b, p. 211).
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much better than more ontologically oriented alternatives. (Woodward
2003b, p. 232)
For example, Woodward regards Newton’s theory of gravity (within its do-
main of applicability) as (genuinely) explanatory, since it correctly latches onto
explanatory modal relations so as to answer a range of what-if-things-had-been-
different questions. The fact that the fundamental ontology of Newton’s theory is
false—nothing in the world corresponds to the notion of gravitational force, for
example—is of little consequence to the theory’s explanatory status. One way
to capture this (qualified) instrumentalism is to say that in Woodward’s account
‘gravitational force’ (as a theoretical posit) plays a thin explanatory role, while
the corresponding thick role is being played by the objective dependency relations
correctly captured by the theory.22
In Woodward’s account there is scope for regarding mathematics also as play-
ing a thin explanatory role, on a par with Newtonian gravity. Whether or not math-
ematics employed in scientific explanations is true in a realist sense, mathematics
can be explanatory by virtue of allowing us to grasp physical dependency rela-
tions that play a thick explanatory role and are ultimately fully responsible for the
explanatoriness of an explanation.
Consider the cicadas again. Explaining this phenomenon in a Woodwardian
framework is a matter of grasping how the fitness-maximizing life-cycle of a given
cicada species—construed as a variable that can take different values—depends
on other biologically relevant variables, such as other cicada species’ and predator
species’ life-cycles. Even if mathematics is indispensably involved in grasping,
or representing these explanatory modal facts, in Woodward’s account it is only
the modal facts themselves that are ultimately the source of explanatory power.
22SeeWoodward 2003a. Harper (2011) explores in great detail the surprising richness of the modal
relations encapsulated in Newton’s theory.
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An advocate of this account could thus agree with Baker, Colyvan, and Lyon that
number theory is indispensable for a maximally ‘robust’ or ‘general’ explanation
of the cicada periods, without viewing the numbers themselves as playing a thick
explanatory role. Rather, number theory would be viewed as an indispensable
vehicle for grasping the relevant modal facts: roughly speaking, in the long run
the evolution of a prime-numbered period of p years depends only on there be-
ing competing/predator species of nearby periods and ‘ecological constraints’ that
appropriately limit the range of viable possibilities (cf. Sect. 3).23
One may question the depth of the analogy between Newtonian gravity and
mathematical explanations: Newtonian gravity of course is not really indispens-
able for explaining gravitational phenomena, given that we can (a) formulate New-
tonian gravity geometrically (as the Newton-Cartan theory), so that the explanatory
modal relations are captured by the curvature of 4-dimensional spacetime instead
of gravitational force, and (b) supplant the theory by general theory of relativity
that is explanatorily deeper by virtue of encompassing a larger set of explanatory
dependence relations.24
In response, it can be argued that the indispensability or otherwise of a theoret-
ical posit is neither here nor there regarding the key issue at stake: in Woodward’s
account a theory can be truly explanatory even if its ‘fundamental ontology’ is only
playing a thin explanatory role. A right-minded advocate of the account would not
infer the reality of gravitational force from its explanatory indispensability, even
if Newton’s theory had not been supplanted by general relativity, and even if the
practising scientists preferred gravitational force explanations over a cumbersome
Newton-Cartan formulation.
23An explanation that captures this ‘robustness’ or ‘generality’ of the prime numbered periods
with respect to historico-ecological details can be viewed in Woodward’s account as maximizing a
particular dimension of ‘explanatory depth’, measured by the number of what-if-things-had-been-
different questions. (See Hitchcock and Woodward 2003)
24This theory captures a larger set of explanatory dependencies since it is applicable to a wider
range of situations, involving e.g. very large masses and velocities.
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What must be admitted, however, is that this instrumentalist aspect of Wood-
ward’s account is a double-edged sword for a scientific realist who wishes to link
explanatory indispensability to ontological commitment for quarks, electrons, and
other non-mathematical theoretical posits: these of course can similarly be con-
strued as playing only a thin explanatory role. Therefore any ‘explanationist’ ar-
gument for realism about quarks, electrons etc. must incorporate more than mere
appeal to explanatory indispensability. (I will reflect on this issue further in the
concluding section 8.)
Woodward’s account of explanation is not the only game in town; there are of
course competing theories in the ontic spirit. While not aiming to offer a compre-
hensive review, I will briefly consider one prominent alternative next: Strevens’s
(2008) kairetic account.
7 Kairetic account of explanation
Strevens’s (2008) theory of explanation provides a criterion of explanatory rel-
evance as a matter of difference-making: to explain an explanandum is (roughly
speaking) to say what made a difference to it taking place or having the features
it has. I am not going to delve deeply into the rich details of Strevens’ ‘kairetic’
account of difference-making. My objective is rather to make the point that also
in this ontic account a distinction between thick and thin explanatory roles can be
drawn so as to enable us to divorce explanatory indispensability from ontological
commitments.
At the heart of Strevens’s account is the idea that explanatory difference-makers
can be specified by abstraction from the specific details of fundamental causal re-
lations (as well as laws and background conditions).25 The abstracted difference-
25The intuitive idea can be illustrated as follows. A hooligan throws a rock into a window. What
made a difference to the complete shattering of the window is a complex combination of the pro-
jectile’s hardness, manner of impact, and momentum being together ‘enough.’ More specific facts
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making facts are facts about nomological dependence (that Strevens understands as
causation); thus, Strevens’s is an ontic account. As with Woodward, a DN-type ex-
planatory deduction is only explanatory to the extent it provides information about
such worldly dependence relations. (Strevens is metaphysically more committed
than Woodward: an explanatory deduction must ‘mirror’ worldly relations of ex-
planatory relevance grounded in fundamental causal relations.)
Specifying difference-makers through abstraction has some remarkable pay-
offs. For example, Strevens uses it to give an account of the explanatory role of
deliberate falsehoods involved in idealisations (e.g. the ideal gas model explana-
tion of Boyles’s law). Of particular interest to us is the way in which abstraction
can also naturally lead to mathematical explanations in science, explanations in
which mathematics is more than a derivational handmaiden by virtue of convey-
ing ‘understanding that turns on the appreciation of a central fact that is a matter
of mathematics alone’ (Strevens 2008, p. 301). That is, through abstraction math-
ematics can acquire a bona fide explanatory role. But at the same time Strevens
explicitly states that ‘[one does not need] metaphysical assumptions to spell out its
additional contribution to explanatory goodness’ (Strevens 2008, p. 304). In other
words, Strevens denies that mathematics, even when indispensable, gets to play a
thick, ontologically committing explanatory role.
According to Strevens mathematics can be indispensably involved in explana-
tion in two ways.
First, the mathematical structure of an explanatory derivation must re-
flect the corresponding relations of causal production in the world.
regarding the missile’s velocity or mass, say, should not be construed as difference-makers in and
of themselves, since we could vary any of those precise facts without altering the outcome (as spe-
cified by the explanandum). There is an unduly complicated story of fundamental physics about
the precise causal mechanism involved. The explanation of breaking does not explicitly involve the
details of this story; the difference-maker is rather an abstract amalgamation of the object’s hardness,
momentum, and manner of impact.
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Only by grasping the mathematical structure do you follow the pro-
cess of production from beginning to end. Second, the mathematics
of the derivation tells you implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, what
makes a difference to the causal production and what does not, and
why it does or does not. (Strevens 2008, p. 329)
The first is a matter of mathematics being indispensable to (our best way of) de-
ducing the explanandum from the explanans so as to mirror relations of causal
dependence. Here a thick explanatory role is played by facts about causal depend-
ence, and mathematics (quite obviously) only plays a thin role of representing the
relevant laws, properties, and causal dependencies. Most explanatory derivations
in physics and mathematical sciences are of this sort, and not ‘distinctly mathem-
atical’ in the sense of Lange 2013.
The second, more interesting way for mathematics to contribute is exemplified
by the cicada example. A detailed reconstruction and analysis of the cicada case
in the context of Strevens’s account is beyond the confines of this paper, but we
can capture the gist of the matter by saying that in a Strevensian framework the
mathematics functions to show how the explanandum is independent from the low-
level causal details.26 Namely, in the stylized cicada explanation (cf. Sect. 3) the
derivation of (6) employes number theory so as to allow us to grasp the fact that
almost nothing about the causal trajectories of individual cicadas makes a relevant
difference to the long-run tendency to evolve a period that is co-prime to every
ecologically available alternative.
Altogether, Strevens maintains that only facts about causal dependence play a
thick explanatory role, and he is adamant that mathematics, while indispensable in
this way, is only playing a thin explanatory role:
26Strevens does not consider the cicada example, but for comparison one can look at his evolu-
tionary example of homozygous elephant seals which has some of the same features.
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No philosophy of mathematics, note, is invoked. I assume only that
mathematics is somehow able to serve as a representer of things in the
world; this is consistent both with the view that the world is inherently
mathematical and with the contrary view. (Strevens 2008, p. 330)
8 Broader reflections
The principal aim of my discussion has been to make a simple but crucial methodo-
logical point: debates about the ‘explanatory role’ of mathematics (in the context of
the indispensability argument) should be conducted much more closely in relation
to specific accounts and conceptions of explanation. There are fruitful, more fine-
grained discussions to be had about the various interesting cases of explanatory
mathematics in the context of the recent ontic accounts of explanation developed
by Strevens and Woodward, for example, and in the context of the modal account
developed by Lange. In relation to these specific accounts I have argued that the
advocates of the enhanced indispensability argument have fallen much short of
having shown that mathematics, even when indispensable, plays the kind of thick
explanatory role that is ontologically committing. (I believe there are further dis-
tinctions between ontologically committing and ontologically peripheral explanat-
ory roles to be drawn in connection with various epistemic and modal accounts of
explanation as well, and there is therefore much further work to be done to defend
the indispensability argument, whichever account of explanation is preferred.)
I would now like to suggest more generally that also in other philosophical
contexts arguments from explanatory indispensability would considerably benefit
from precisifying the intuitive notion of explanatory indispensability in terms of a
philosophical conception of explanation. My argument has taken place purely in
the context of the indispensability argument for mathematical realism, but there is
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an obvious broader context for it. Consider the debate on scientific realism to be-
gin with. The (explanatory) indispensability argument has been designed to mimic
similar arguments for scientific realism, and there is indeed a long tradition in
philosophy of science, going back to the very architects of the indispensability
argument, to argue for scientific realism by attuning to the explanatory role that
theoretical posits like quarks and electrons play in science. If an argument for sci-
entific realism about quarks or electrons is nothing but an explanatory indispensab-
ility argument applied to these theoretical posits, it should clearly be supplemented
with a justification for thinking that the relevant theoretical posits are playing a
thick explanatory role. It is an interesting question exactly when this supplement
can be provided, and what role (if any) causation should play.27 Not all realist
arguments can be readily assimilated with the explanatory indispensability argu-
ment, however, and even in the case of the realist’s most famous inference to the
best explanation—the no-miracles argument—it has been argued that it can be nat-
urally furnished with fine-structure that critically differentiates it from the abstract
explanatory indispensability argument (see e.g. Saatsi 2007).
There is also a (related) tradition in the philosophy of science, going back to
Sellars 1963, to accept an ‘explanatory criterion of reality’:
The only workable criterion of reality is the explanatory criterion:
something is real if its positing plays an indispensable role in the ex-
planation of well-founded phenomena. (Psillos 2011, p. 15)
Psillos is a scientific realist who takes his cue from Sellars, and in the spirit and
letter of the above criterion argues that the scientific realist should be committed
not only to the reality quarks, electrons, and such, but also to abstract models,
27It is not difficult to conceive of potentially relevant differences between mathematical and non-
mathematical theoretical posits. There are many thinkable differences in the explanatory roles
played by imaginary or prime numbers and quarks, for example, that do not boil down to the non-
causal/causal contrast. The simple idea that ordinary observable matter is in some sense composed
of quarks, for example, could perhaps serve as a starting point.
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mathematics, and a host of other abstracta, because they all play an indispensable
role in explaining empirical phenomena (Psillos 2010, 2011). In my view Psillos’s
brief shares the indispensability argument’s shortcoming explored in this paper: the
notion that idealized models and various other kinds of abstracta are indispensable
to scientific explanations does not suffice to establish a realist commitment to them.
What is needed is an argument that these objects play a thick explanatory role.28
It is easy to find other explanation-driven arguments in other areas of metaphys-
ics that bear a close resemblance to these examples from philosophy of science.
Some Australasian metaphysicians, like Armstrong and Sankey, are well known to
frame their arguments for universals and natural kinds in terms of (something like)
explanatory indispensability. As far as I am concerned, such arguments have little
probative force without a proper analysis of the sense of explanation in play. Going
even further afield, we find instances of (something very much like) the explanat-
ory indispensability argument in areas such as meta-ethics, where we perhaps have
even less of an idea what explanation exactly amounts to.29
There is a general, commonsensical point to be made about all such arguments:
ultimately a handle is needed on the concept of explanation involved, for how else
can we really assess the epistemic and ontological import of explanatory indispens-
ability, if not by first spelling out what it takes to explain something?
28For example, Psillos argues that a scientific realist should countenance the reality of (non-
mathematical) abstract objects like a system’s centre of mass because it can play an indispensable ex-
planatory role (despite being causally inert). Now, if one examines such an explanation in Strevens’s
account, for instance, the centre of mass naturally comes out as an explanatory difference-maker. But
given the details of the account, it does so in a way that need not elicit a realist reification of it over
and above of the more fundamental facts by virtue of which it is a difference-maker.
29See e.g. Sturgeon 2006 and Enoch 2013 for discussions of explanation as a guide to epistemo-
logy and metaphysics of moral realism.
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